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Abstract 5
Bioprospection is, largely, meant to help reducing deforestation and, the other
way around, stopping deforestation enhances the prospects of bioprospection. The
need for a global agreement to the problem of tropical deforestation has led to the
REDD (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation) scheme, which
proposes that developed countries pay developing countries for CO2 emissions saved 10
through avoided deforestation and degradation. The remaining issue at stake is to
de￿ne the rules de￿ning payments to countries reducing their deforestation rate.
This article develops a game-theoretic bargaining model, simulating the on-going
negotiation process which is currently taking place within the Convention of Climate
Change, after the Copenhagen agreement of December 2009. It shows that the 15
conditions under which developing countries are left to bargain over the allocation
of the global forest fund may lead to an ine￿ective system of incentives. Below a given
level of contributions from the North, the mechanism fails to curb the deforestation.
Beyond this level, it induces perverse e￿ects: the larger the North’s contribution, the
larger the deforestation rate. Consequently, the mechanism is most e￿ective only at 20
a speci￿c threshold level which, given the unobservability of countries’preferences,
can only be found by a repeated ￿trial and error￿ implementation process.
11 Introduction
It is demonstrated that carbon emissions from deforestation could represent up to 20% of
anthropogenic carbon emissions (IPCC, 2007). It is also argued that climate change miti- 25
gation objectives could be achieved with lower opportunity costs by limiting deforestation
rates, especially in tropical countries where the concentration of carbon stored by trees and
soils is high, rather than by abating industrial and energy emissions in developed coun-
tries (Murray and al., 2009). Hence, curbing CO2 emissions from tropical deforestation
has become an important challenge of international negotiations at the United Nations 30
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). In 2007, the 13th conference of
parties (COP) of the UNFCCC adopted the ￿Bali roadmap￿ which encouraged parties to
explore the feasibility of a new North-South ￿nancial transfer scheme, called the United
Nations program on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD).
The underlying logic of this scheme is simple: it proposes that developing countries be 35
paid for carbon emissions saved through avoided deforestation, either by a system of car-
bon credits, tradable on carbon markets, or by an international fund, ￿nanced mostly by
contributions from developed countries. Since then, the policy debate of the last three
years has essentially focused on the way such transfer scheme should be designed. The
most popular option is to compensate developing countries proportionally to the di￿erence 40
between their observed rate of deforestation and a given reference rate, with a per-unit
compensation aligned on the market price of carbon. Therefore, one of the key issues
of the negotiations is the de￿nition of reference levels since they will both determine the
payments received by each country and the size of the total North-South transfer. It has
triggered hot debates amongst developing countries themselves and no consensus has been 45
reached so far.
However, despite this uncertainty, the principle of such scheme was o￿cially endorsed
by the international community in the Copenhagen Agreement of December 2009 which
stated: ￿we recognize the crucial role of REDD [...] and agree on the need to provide
positive incentives to such actions through the immediate establishment of a mechanism 50
[...], to enable the mobilization of ￿nancial resources from developed countries￿ (UNFCCC,
2010). A number of countries, among them USA, France, and the United Kingdom, have
tabled US$ 3.5 billion to get the REDD scheme started for the 2010-2012 period and to
encourage broader participation by other donor countries. The international community is
therefore facing a situation in which international funding is available to pay for avoided 55
deforestation but the issue of compensation rules remains unanswered. Is it su￿cient
2to ensure the success of the REDD scheme? We argue in this paper that the way the
REDD scheme is being negotiated and set-up may induce serious design ￿aws, which are
very likely to make it ine￿ective. The main reason is that the negotiation over reference
levels may lead to perverse incentives. An ine￿ective REDD scheme could also lead to 60
the acceleration of terrestrial biodiversity loss. A better-designed transfer scheme could
be envisaged which could also attract other types of contributors such as bioprospection
￿rms. They would then pay to preserve forested prospection areas.
Our present work develops a game theoretic model of the way international negotia-
tions on REDD are unfolding. This model helps to analyze whether the REDD scheme, 65
as it is negotiated today, can really lead to a successful outcome, or whether it might end
up with no gain in avoided deforestation, and the absence of any further ￿nancial contri-
butions by developed countries. The article is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a
short historical perspective on international negotiations on deforestation and summarizes
the main contributions of economic theory to the debate. Section 3 describes a simple 70
framework where the North-South dimension of the deforestation negotiation dilemma
can be captured. It uses this framework to investigate the logic of the REDD compensa-
tion scheme and to simulate the outcomes of current negotiations over the REDD scheme
design. We show that the negotiated mechanism can be e￿ective only for a speci￿c level
of contributions by developed countries: under this threshold, it has no impact of defor- 75
estation. Above this threshold, any additional funding is counter-productive because it
increases deforestation! The fourth section concludes on the welfare properties of such
mechanism. Overall, the present analysis shows that the REDD scheme should be de-
signed di￿erently if e￿ectiveness is to be garanteed.
2 Con￿icts at stake in the REDD negotiation 80
Developed countries have long been aware of the alarming rate at which deforestation
is taking place in tropical countries and of the irreversible losses associated with the
destruction of the primary forest. However, although several attempts were made to
establish a multilateral convention on forest protection, in the last 25 years, developing
countries have been reluctant to make commitments which could jeopardize their rights 85
to exploit their forestry resources without compensations from the rest of the world.
The 1992 Rio summit failed to launch an e￿ective forest convention. Since then, the
only outcome of international negotiations on forests has been the adoption of non-legally
3binding principles concerning sustainable forest management and trade of tropical timber 1.
The failure to reach a global agreement has been however partially compensated by 90
other types of initiatives, mainly driven by biodiversity conservation concerns: there are
a few examples of bilateral agreements in which a donor country ￿nances the protection
of a speci￿c forest area in a host country; the Convention on biological diversity (CBD)
has also promoted a protected area policy, ￿nanced through the Global Environment
Facility2 (GEF). In both cases, it is a project-based approach, based on the principle 95
of additionality, in which donor countries only pay for incremental costs of protection
in a given area of a host country: they are willing to compensate the operational costs
of conservation, as well as a proportion of foregone revenues from land uses other than
conservation, for the forest protection measures that would not have been undertaken
otherwise by host countries. Although it supposedly satis￿es the individual participation 100
constraints of tropical forest countries, it has been limited in scope (Deke 2004), due
to cumbersome control and administrative procedures and to the insu￿cient ￿nancial
resources of the GEF which depend on voluntary contributions of donor countries. The
negotiations on climate change also failed to include deforestation in the 1997 Kyoto
protocol, mainly because of methodological and implementation issues. However, the 105
urgency of global warming has brought deforestation back to the forefront and the ￿rst
proposal for a North-South transfer scheme called REDD, paying for avoided deforestation
was tabled in March 2005 by the Coalition of Rainforest nations 3 at the 11th COP of the
UNFCCC in Montreal.
The main innovation of REDD is to shift away from a logic of cost compensation 110
towards a logic of purchase of CO2 storage service. Until then, all transfers were input-
based payments, ￿nancing implementation costs of forest conservation in host countries.
The REDD transfers are output-based payments: they are allocated per unit of real
reduction of deforestation rate, compared to a reference level or baseline. The ojective
is thus to encourage host countries to reduce their deforestation rate below the agreed 115
reference level. Formally, the transfer T received by the host country is calculated as
1For more details on Forest principles see http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-
3annex3.htm
2The Global Environment Facility (GEF) is a global partnership reuniting 178 countries, international
institutions, non-governmental organizations and private ￿rms. It helps to ￿nance sustainable develop-
ment initiatives in the ￿eld of global environmental issues. It is also the designated ￿nancial mechanism
for some multilateral environmental agreements and framework conventions.
3See http://www.rainforestcoalition.org/
4T = t(db   d) where db is the deforestation baseline and d is the observed deforestation
rate of the host country. The per-unit payment t should re￿ect the market price of avoided
carbon emissions rather than the individual countries’ conservation costs. Host countries
retain full sovereignty over the way they want to achieve the reduction in deforestation 120
rate.
With the recognition of the role of REDD (renamed then REDD+ to include enhance-
ment of carbon stock: forest regeneration and rehabilitation, and carbon removals) in the
Copenhagen Agreement, the 1999 COP-15 has also obtained the promise by developed
countries to provide new and additional resources for the mitigation of climate change and 125
adaptation for developing countries. The collective commitment by developed countries
is to provide resources approaching US$ 30 billion for the 3-years period 2010 - 2012 as
a ￿fast-start￿ fund for adaptation and mitigation. The announced goal, owever, is more
ambitious: it is to ￿mobilize jointly USD 100 billion per year by 2020 to address the needs
of developing countries￿(UNFCCC, 2010), in addition to o￿cial development aid which 130
is supposed to amount already to 0.7% of GDP of developed countries. USA, Japan,
Australia, France, Norway and the United Kingdom have already agreed on a fast-start
contribution of US$ 3.5 billion for the 2010-2012 period, speci￿cally dedicated to REDD 4.
An agreement in principle on the ￿nancial contribution provided by donor countries was
therefore concluded but it remains to be seen whether a workable agreement can be reached 135
on the way REDD funds should be allocated.
One of the most debated issues is the mode of calculation of the baseline (Tacconi,
2009). The de￿nition of the baseline will in￿uence decision-making in both donor and
host countries, through the calculations of the transfers obtained by host countries, the
size of total contributions to be made by donor countries and the net gains in terms of 140
avoided CO2 emissions. If host countries succeed in negotiating high baselines, they will
obtain large transfers without providing much e￿ort in terms of avoided deforestation. On
the other hand, too low a baseline will deter their participation in the the REDD program
(Karsenty and Pirard, 2007).
Negotiating parties and research institutions have submitted di￿erent proposals for 145
the methodology of the baseline calculation: the ￿historical￿ baseline would re￿ect past
trends of deforestation rates, at the individual level or at the global level, or a mix of
both; the ￿business-as-usual￿ (BAU) baseline would be calculated on the basis of the
deforestation rate that would occur without the implementation of REDD. Whereas the
4See http://ictsd.org/i/news/biores/74825/ for more details.
5latter method can end up in endless controversies about the methodology to establish 150
predicted scenarios of deforestation, the former approach penalizes countries with low
past rates of deforestation and overlooks the ￿forest transition￿ phenomenon 5. This is
already revealed by the strategic positions of Brazil and Indonesia, two large deforesting
countries defending the adoption of the historical baseline system, as opposed to the
positions of Costa Rica and countries of the Congo Basin, with past low deforestation 155
rates, defending a BAU baseline. Despite the numerous proposals put on the negotiation
table, no agreement has been reached on the baseline calculation method so far. The
￿rst explanation is that countries have diverging views on the criteria that should justify
international transfers: whereas some countries argue that transfers should ￿punish￿ past
bad behavior, even at the expense of e￿ciency, others want transfer payments that deter 160
threats of increasing emissions in the future by o￿ering greater compensation to countries
with greater nuisance capacity. Another more fundamental reason is that the baseline
calculation is a key element in the negotiation strategies of host countries, who are aware
that they will have to share between them the funds made available by donor countries
to limit deforestation. The discussions about the baseline are to some extent comparable 165
to a bargaining game among developing countries for sharing a new resource.
The hurdle in this international negotiation is quite unusual. In the vast theoretical
literature on international environmental agreements, few papers focus on the transfer
schemes between developed countries wishing to conserve natural resources with global
public bene￿ts, and developing countries which have sovereignty over these resources. 170
Developed countries (or donor countries) have to decide on their individual contributions
to the multilateral fund, whereas developing countries (host countries) decide on their
participation in the scheme and on the relative e￿ort provided by each in the total con-
servation e￿ort. The division between developed countries and developing countries of
the net surplus generated by the cooperation is also at stake. Barrett (1994) focuses on 175
the free-rider problem in the contribution game to a global biodiversity conservation fund
by developed countries. He shows that when a self-enforcing full cooperative agreement
is attainable, then the net bene￿ts are small compared to the non cooperative outcome.
5Advocates of the forest transition phenomenon argue that high rates of deforestation are only tran-
sitory and should decline in time. Rudel et al. (2005) assume two paths to explain the forest transition:
the economic development path, economic opportunities and non-farm jobs lead to the abandonment of
less productive arable land which can revert into forest, and the scarcity path, the decrease in forest cover
fosters landowners and forest compagnies to replenish the forest. This should be taken into account in
the revision of the baseline to avoid unnecessary monetary compensations.
6Neumayer (2001) summarizes this ￿nding by stating that "cooperation is either narrow
(instead of wide) or shallow (instead of deep)". However, Barrett’s model, like most 180
models on international cooperation, overlooks the potentially strategic behaviour of de-
veloping countries in the transfer game. In the current REDD negotiations, developed
countries have recognized the importance of deforestation REDD and have already put a
￿gure on the initial amount available for transfer. Developing countries will have space
to negotiate over the sharing rules of these new ￿nancial resources. It is not unreasonable 185
to assume that the main driver of the negotiation will be to obtain the largest possible
share of the fund, and that developed countries won’t have much in￿uence in the negoti-
ation process between host countries, except by establishing the credible threat that that
they can withdraw from the fund, if they are in disagreement with the outcomes of the
negotiation on sharing rules. Rupert et al. (2004) are the only authors who look more 190
speci￿cally at the recipient countries’ joint strategies in a North-South game. They use
a biodiversity bargaining game in which developing countries act strategically to extract
more surplus from donor countries: they show that badly-designed institutions can in fact
engender perverse e￿ects which reduce biodiversity conservation instead of stimulating it.
We use a similar approach to build a stylized model of the North-South negotiation 195
over the implementation of the REDD scheme in which the developed countries’ decisions
are their ￿nancial contributions to the global fund and the developing countries’ strategic
decisions are their individual deforestation rate. The originality of the model is to endo-
genize the decision on individual baselines by making it the outcome of a South-South
negotiation. 200
3 The North-South bargaining model
Consider two developing countries in the South (labelled i = 1;2) with a high endowment
of forests. The North (representing developed countries)can decide to contribute to a
global transfer fund which is used to pay rewards to developing countries accepting to
reduce their deforestation levels under a given individual baseline. The size e of the global 205
transfer fund set by the North is known by developing countries. Let di 2 ]0;dmax
i [; i =
1;2, be the area deforested by country i, where dmax
i is the total forest area of country i.
Let (d1;d2) be the vector of deforestation decisions.
Southern countries’ preferences are captured by utility functions Ui(di ;wi +Ti). The
two arguments of their utility function is deforestation di (which provides land, fuelwood, 210
7and timber) and initial exogenous wealth wi which can be increased by transfers Ti from
the North. Note that the global public good role of forests does not appear in utility
functions of the South. Indeed, developing countries are concerned by climate change
but they consider that e￿orts to mitigate climate change should be supported by the
North only. The global quantity of forests, although it may contribute to curbing global 215
warming, is not considered by developing countries as a global public good 6. Utility
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2  0: (3)
Property 1 indicates that beyond a given deforestation threshold di; the marginal utility
of additional deforestation is zero because the remaining forested area is unsuitable for the 220
development of farming and logging activities, due to geographical reasons (remoteness
from roads and markets), bio-physical reasons (nature of soils, slopes, climatic conditions)
or economic reasons (the net pro￿tability of deforestation becomes negative).
In the rest of the paper, and without loss of generality, we will limit the analysis to
the case when the marginal utility of deforestation is not changed by the level of wealth: 225
Assumption 1
U12 = 0: (4)
Although such an assumption is not easily testable, we assume that Southern countries
eligible for REDD payments have not reached the inversion point of the ￿forest transition￿
phase. The utility of deforestation is very high and a change in exogenous wealth has
little or no e￿ect on the marginal utility of deforestation.
This simple model captures the logic underlying the North-South deforestation dilemma: 230
Southern countries can enjoy the same or perhaps a higher level of utility after limiting de-
forestation, provided their sacri￿ce is o￿set by a su￿cient increase of the second argument,
wealth, through ￿nancial transfers.
6A formulation that captures this role would have dj; j 6= i; as a third argument in the utility functions.
8The REDD mechanism compensates developing countries which reduce their deforesta-
tion below a baseline level db
i, db
i < di: The ￿nancial transfers Ti are paid proportionnally 235










if di < db
i ;
0 otherwise:
t is the transfer rate. It re￿ects the value of avoided deforestation in terms of reduced
emissions of carbon 7. The budget of the global transfer fund must balance. Therefore, if
the sum of the Northern countries’ contributions to the fund is e then:
T1 + T2 = e:
Under the laissez-faire scenario, in the absence of the REDD mechanism, there are 240





















that it will choose to deforest  di. The resulting global deforestation level d1+d2 is judged
to be too high by Northern countries: they are willing to contribute to a common ￿nancial 245
fund e, in order to compensate Southern countries accepting to reduce their deforestation
activities.
In the rest of the paper, we will assume usual Inada conditions to avoid corner decisions






















































7It was suggested in a number of arena that t could be measured as follows: t = CD3:66PC where
CD is the carbon density of preserved forests ( tonC=Ha), 3:66 is the atomic ratio of carbon dioxyde to
carbon (tonCO2=C) and PC is the price of an emission permit for one ton of CO2, on existing carbon
markets.
9Under Assumptions 2 and 3 and the other assumptions made so far, there exists an
interior local maximum d





















Under Assumptions 2, 3 and 4, country i’s utility, as a function of di; is depicted in 255
Figure 1. It has a discontinuity point at di = db
i:
We assume that international negotiations on the implementation of REDD run as
follows:
1. The North decides upon the size of the international fund e. This stage corresponds
to the collective commitment by Northern countries at the COP-15 to provide USD 260
30 billion for the period 2010-2012, which will partly ￿nance REDD+ activities. To
this fund should be added USD 3.5 billion provided speci￿cally for REDD+ by a
subset of developed countries8.
2. Southern countries bargain amongst themselves over their respective baselines know-
ing the size of the global transfer fund e and the per unit "price" for avoided defor- 265
estation t . Northern countries do not take part directly in this negotiation. They
nevertheless retain strong bargaining power since they can decide to withdraw their
￿nancial contributions to e if the decisions made by Southern countries do not suit
them. Therefore the South, as a whole, is confronted with a take-it-or-leave-it o￿er.
3. Once the rules upon the baselines are set, Southern countries independently choose 270
their deforestation rates by maximizing their utility. We assume in this formal model
that countries can control the deforestation rate. The reality is more complex since
deforestation is the outcome of decentralized actions by many private agents who
are not easily controlled and monitored by public authorities. However, since the
REDD mechanism implicitly assumes that the state can inforce its decisions on 275
deforestation agents, we adopt the same set of assumptions.
The model is solved by backward induction. An example using a logarithmic utility is
provided in the ￿rst appendix.
8USA, Japan, Australia, France, Norway and the UK.
103.1 Deforestation decisions
In the last decision period, developing countries choose their optimal deforestation level 280
d
i which maximizes their utility under the REDD mechanism, knowing their baseline db
i
(determined in the previous period). We focus on the solution d
i of the utility maximiza-
tion when d
i < db










i;wi + Ti) = 0; i = 1;2: (5)
From the ￿rst order conditions of the utility maximization problem, using the implicit 285
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2 ]0;1[ : (8)
This result indicates that country i0s deforestation increases, but less than proportionally,
with the baseline level db
i that is negotiated in the second stage. 290
















The sign of this expression is surprisingly ambiguous: intuitively, we expect that a
higher compensation rate per unit of avoided deforestation t reduces the optimal deforesta-
tion decision d













countries will not need to reduce further their deforestation to receive a higher payment. 295
This shows that the choice of t is crucial in the e￿ectiveness of the scheme.
113.2 Bargaining over the baselines in the South
In the second period, Southern countries anticipate the third period decisions described
above and have been informed about the size of the global fund e from Northern countries
We assume that Southern countries bargain between themselves on the value of their 300
respective baselines, knowing that they cannot collectively claim more than e and that




















































The bargaining over the baseline can be conceptualized in several ways. We use here
the Nash bargaining solution concept.
















If Southern countries fail to reach an agreement, there will be no North-South trans- 310












































 represents the feasible set of baseline decisions given by (10); 1 and ; are







solve the ￿rst-order conditions given by:
i(H
i    Hi)
i 1(H
j    Hj)
jH
i0 + j(H
i    Hi)
i(H







for i;j = 1;2; i 6= j.
123.3 Choice of global transfer e by the North 320
A necessary condition for the North to accept to contribute to the global fund e is that
￿nancial transfers be e￿ective and induce a reduction in total deforestation. Let’s therefore
evaluate the marginal impact of a greater contribution by the North to the global fund




















is positive and strictly inferior to 1.




Proposition Starting from a level of transfer that sustains an interior optimum for de-
forestation decisions, the greater the size of the global transfer fund e, the greater the
agreed baselines and the larger the deforestation rates. 330
Proof. See above and appendix 2
Therefore, under the assumptions made so far, an increase in the total contributions
from the North to the global fund increases the level of deforestation chosen by developing
countries! The mechanism implements a wrong incentive program: instead of reducing 335
deforestation further, it induces developing countries to increase their level of deforestation
and still gain positive transfers. This result, striking at ￿rst sight, is rather intuitive
upon re￿ection. An increase in the size of the global fund is matched by an increase in
negotiated baselines because developing countries interpret it as a greater pie to share.
This leaves room for an increase of deforestation, provided it is not too large compared to 340
the increment of the baseline, in order to get a strictly positive transfer Ti. Expression (13)






@e . To put it another way,
there is a pernicious e￿ect that stems from the endogenous adjustment of the baselines.
As regards ￿nancial contributions to the global transfer fund, the North therefore has
incentives to downsize them in order to limit the temptation by developing countries to 345
negotiate higher baselines. From the above proposition, this will reduce the baselines and
the optimal deforestation decisions in the South. The utility levels attained in the South
at the negotiated baselines will also be reduced. Therefore, there may exist a speci￿c











2), such that for any lower size of the global transfer fund, developing countries 350
will prefer to give up transfers and will choose their maximal deforestation rates. These
speci￿c baselines are those that just meet Condition 4; they equalize the utility level at
an interior solution with the utility level at the upper corner (see Figures 2 and 3). They
are de￿ned as the solution to:
U
i = U












]; i = 1;2:








and deforestation rates (d
1;d
2), the corre- 355

















What the analysis of the present paper reveals is that the North should not contribute
more e; since this will increase deforestation and cost more at the same time. Should
it provide a smaller transfer fund than e; given that deforestation levels in the South
would then rocket to their maximum levels? The answer depends on the comparison of 360
the North’s utility levels achieved at e = e and e = 0.
Assume that the North’s preferences are captured by a continuous and concave utility
function U3(d;w3) which is decreasing with global deforestation d = d1+d2 and increasing
with its wealth w3. Properties of U3 are the following: U3
1 < 0 and U3
2 > 0.
To summarize: 365





> > > <
> > > :
e if U3(d;w3   e)  U3(d;w3) ;
0 otherwise.
In practice, identifying the threshold e is no simple matter, in particular because it
depends on utility parameters which are not readily observable. Di￿erently stated, the
mechanism is either ine￿ective, or it implies a waste of resources, except at e: 370
3.4 Welfare properties of the REDD mechanism
Although the REDD mechanism is primarily designed to reduce deforestation, it is inter-
esting to analyze its properties in terms of global welfare. Since there is no supranational
14authority to enforce the mechanism, it only relies on voluntary participation. Therefore, 375
when the mechanism is e￿ective, i.e. when e = e; the utility levels of both Northern
and Southern countries are at least the same as in the laissez-faire situation and REDD
is Pareto improving.
A more ambitious goal for REDD would be to achieve Pareto optimality, while im-











3(d1 + d2;m3); (14)
where (1;2;3) 2 <3
+ are respectively the weights of countries 1, 2 and 3 in the global
welfare function, 1 + 2 + 3 = 1; and mi is the ￿nancial endowment of country i after
the transfer: m1 = w1 + T1, m2 = w2 + T2 and m3 = w3   e. 385
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Recall that non cooperative decisions are given by equation (5):
U
i
1 (di;wi + Ti)   tU
i
2 (di;wi + Ti) = 0; i = 1;2:
Therefore, comparing (15) and (5) Pareto optimality of the Nash equilibrium requires also












The Pareto optimality of the REDD mechanism is therefore a fragile property, because 395
it imposes that the rate of transfer t be calculated on the basis of countries’preferences
and weights in the global welfare function, whereas it is in reality planned to be calculated
15on the basis of the market price of carbon, which itself depends on the number of emission
permits that will be delivered under the post-Kyoto agreement. The probability that the
market value of t coincides with its Pareto-optimal value is very small. The scenario under 400
which a perfectly-informed supranational authority would impose such value is even less
plausible.
4 Conclusion
This stylised model challenges the generally accepted idea that the REDD program is
a step in the right direction to curb deforestation. Whereas most studies focus on spe- 405
ci￿c implementation issues, such as additionality, leakage and links to poverty-alleviation
projects (for a review, see Angelsen, 2009), this paper shows that the basic principles
of the scheme - a payment in return for avoided deforestation - are very likely to be
ill-designed and to lead to ine￿cient outcomes. This is due to the nature of current inter-
national negotiations over the de￿nition of REDD allocation rules: we show that a transfer 410
mechanism in which the size of the global transfer is chosen before rules are de￿ned for
the baseline can generate perverse incentives. This stems from the fact that it creates
incentives for developing countries to negotiate greater baselines, therefore allowing them
to minimize their e￿orts of avoided deforestation in exchange of positive transfers. The
mechanism leads to a waste of money when the sum of contributions by Northern countries 415
is higher than a given threshold (let’s call it the e￿ective fund size) and it is une￿cient to
curb deforestation when it is below this level. This result is independent of the structure
of preferences of negotiating parties and of their relative bargaining power. Moreover,
even if donor countries were able to identify the e￿ective fund sizes, there is no guaran-
tee that the resulting income redistribution and reduced deforestation would lead to a 420
Pareto-optimum, since it would also impose to choose a speci￿c value for unit transfers,
re￿ecting the structure of countries’preferences.
Two practical recommandations can be drawn from this theoretical model. The ￿rst
one is that if the negotiation process unfolds as previously discussed, the international
community should give itself the means to reach the e￿ective fund size without falling 425
into the trap of overcontribution. Of course, what is easily calculated theoretically in a
simpli￿ed model is impossible to identify in a real-situation setting because coutries have
very little information on each other’s preferences. However a trial-and-error process could
be adopted in which the level of contributions by donor countries will be progressively
16raised, up to the point when the resulting negotiated baselines will lead to genuinely 430
additive gains in terms of avoided deforestation. The second recommandation is more
radical. It imposes to obtain that a ￿rm agreement be reached on the calculation of
baselines before any commitment is made on the size of the global fund. This may avoid
the trap of perverse incentives but may lead to a deadlock in the negotiation process.
These conclusions are of interest for bioprospection policies. At the moment, and despite 435
recurrent attempts by the Convention on Biological Diversity to make progress on this
issue, deforestation is mostly discussed within the Convention on Climate Change arena.
The justi￿cation of REDD transfers is the ￿nancial compensation for avoided deforestation
in developing countries. A further natural step is to consider that if REDD is successful,
it should also facilitate bioprospection agreements, ￿rst by conserving more biodiversity- 440
rich forests, and second by linking -why not?- bioprospection rights to the contributions
of northern countries to the REDD global fund. Private ￿rms will want to ensure that
their contribution leads to e￿cient outcomes.
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ABCD: when e > e
A’B’C’D: when e = e
A￿B￿C￿D: when e < e
21Appendix 1: A logarithmic example
To illustrate our purpose we could specify utility functionsas follows 9:
U
i(di;wi + Ti) = ilog(di) + i log(wi + Ti); i;i > 0:









Assumption 3 imposes iwi < itdb
i.





























+ i log(wi) :
Assumption 1 is veri￿ed since U12 = 0.

















































9We could assume for instance that:
ui (ci) = ci ;
and that consumption is obtained from a production technology such as:
ci = fi (di;wi + Ti) = ilog(di) + i log(wi + Ti); i;i > 0; i = 1;2:
222. In this particular case where utility functions in both tropical countries are the 505






































If  = , we can ￿nd the db
1 and db
2 that will emerge from the mechanism. To ￿nd
db
i we use the fact that:
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It gives us d
1 and d









3. We impose t <
wi
di to ensure that d
i < di; i = 1;2. As for the North’s utility
function, let us assume it takes the quadratic form:
U








2; a;b;c;f 2 <:
The welfare function is given by (14). With all those speci￿cations, maximizing the 515












2(ii + jj) :
Paremeters are restricted so that dPO
1 < d1 and dPO
2 < d2. If the mechanism is to











1;e) as the function implicitely de￿ned by the ￿rst-order condition(12) for i = 1
and j = 2.
Let  be the bargainig power of country 1 and (1   ) that of country 2.
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Note that (H1   H1) and (H2   H2) are positive by construction of the Nash bargaining
problem. 530
























At the optimal deforestation decision d









10  0: (17)
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